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SET AND DRIFT
BUILDING A BEEHIVE OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRANSITION TO NETWORK-
CENTRIC OPERATIONS
Captain George Kasten, U.S. Navy
Conceptual changes always provoke institutional resistance. Some see net-
work-centric operations (NCOs) as a high-speed train that will ultimately de-
termine the size and shape of future naval forces. Others think NCO could derail
important programs that they believe in. There are also concerns that monu-
mental resource allocations could be pinned to such a new and undeveloped
concept. This debate occurs at a time when there is already fierce interservice
and intraservice competition over the relevance and prioritization of existing
and programmed platforms.
There are big bets to be placed. Is NCO the right horse? The short answer is
yes. Of course, there is much uncertainty. NCO will be the product of many in-
teracting forces. The resulting complexity will make its final form as unpredict-
able as long-range weather. NCO will both shape and be shaped by the character
of future warfare and the development of our strategic culture, as well as by the
reactions of potential adversaries to our developing style of fighting. That is why
NCO should be allowed to evolve without the constraints of a precise script that
would enslave it to inevitable errors in the details.
The information age has set off an avalanche of fundamental change through-
out society. The best-studied effects are still unfolding in the transformation of the
economy. For decades, people have been thrilled, made apprehensive, enchanted,
or unsettled, but always dazzled, by the pace of technological change. Below the
surface, however, lost in the commotion of new discoveries and gadgets, some-
thing much more significant has been emerging—a new economic order.1 Because
of networking, the basic rules of economic behavior have been turned inside
out. New laws of increasing returns describe effects that either had not occurred
previously or were masked by incorrect industrial-age assumptions. During the
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Industrial Age, economics, warfare, and other human behaviors were radically
transformed. The current transformation promises to be equally momentous.
The central issues of this paper are introduced below; each is further devel-
oped later in this discussion. Consensus on these issues can facilitate a smooth
transition to network-centric operations.
High Stakes. NCO will be the essential tool of future naval expeditionary opera-
tions. What is not so clear, however, is whether it will appear on schedule or
within the specifications of any grand plan.
NCO Is Too Big and Too Complex. Complex adaptive systems emerge or evolve
over time after the resolution of innumerable trade-offs related to technologies,
societies, economics, people, and the environment—all under conditions of ir-
reducible uncertainty. The key to the Navy’s transition to NCO will be to set fa-
vorable initial conditions and establish simple rules and to avoid hopeless
attempts to prescribe the final design.
NCO Will Change Our Military’s View of Things. When considered in the con-
text of NCO, age-old questions of warfare will lead to different conclusions
about doctrine, platforms, training, and culture. This is evidence that NCO
should be placed in a separate hierarchy, which is not in competition with pro-
grams and infrastructure (including platforms) which are really subset issues.
Since some subset issues require long-lead decisions and resource commit-
ments, there is some urgency for moving ahead with NCO.
Immediate Value and Paybacks. An important feature of NCO is that while it is
being implemented, it promises immediate benefits in small-scale, littoral oper-
ations. Unlike futuristic initiatives that require large investments and decades of
development time, NCO can enhance the combat effectiveness of current forces.
As it evolves, NCO will become a significant factor in large theater operations.
Sensors Are the Biggest Obstacles to NCO. NCO depends on networked sensors,
people, and weapons. Sensors are currently out of synch with the progress of
communications and weapons. This major flaw could obstruct the maturation
of expeditionary warfare, which again is cause for urgency.
Expeditionary Sensors Are Different. Historical models are unlikely to produce
the sensors that will enable NCO and sustain viable expeditionary forces. The
Navy must field new devices that break the constraints of platform-sponsored
and mounted sensors. In parallel, the Navy must also ensure that expeditionary
needs are included in national sensor-development criteria.
Expeditionary Sensors Should Be Funded. The defense industry excels at the de-
sign and construction of complicated things like high-technology sensors, and
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the short-term payback for fixing sensor deficiencies is large. The Kosovo bomb-
ing campaign offers a straightforward justification for financing sensors that
will restore, or boost, the combat performance of current platforms. “Better sen-
sors along with improved processing and dissemination capabilities are needed
to provide a capability to counter any future adversary.”2
Given the Right Conditions, NCO Will Take Care of Itself. As a concept, NCO is
vague, and as a program it would be too big for funding in the traditional sense.
There is a better way. It is fortunate that complex systems can evolve without too
much attention (engineering) from us.
HIGH STAKES
Network-centric operations constitute a tool or a means to conduct warfare in
the information age. NCO exploits the new, simultaneous technological leaps in
sensors, networked communications, and precision weapons and in their applica-
tion to the problems of expeditionary warfare. The net result should be an un-
precedented ability to influence directly events on land from the sea.
Furthermore, these developments take place at a time in history when the
world’s military problems increasingly arise in scales and locations that lend
themselves to expeditionary operations. To some, the Navy’s role may appear to
be less glamorous and focused than during the Cold War years. The value and
utility of U.S. forces may rise or fall in this new environment; however, relative to
other U.S. services, naval expeditionary forces are poised to become especially
relevant.3 Naval warfare is certainly not a sunset industry. NCO is the essential
tool that will allow naval forces to shoulder increased responsibilities and fulfill
their potential.
W. Brian Arthur of the Santa Fe Institute compares high-tech business deci-
sions in the information age with an imaginary and extreme form of casino
gambling in which the features of the event (including its rules, stakes, and play-
ers) do not emerge until the game unfolds.
Above all, the rewards go to the players that are first to make sense out of the new
games looming out of the technological fog. Bill Gates is not so much a wizard of
technology as a wizard of precognition, of discerning the shape of the next game.
You cannot optimize in the casino of [ill-defined] games. You can be smart. You can
be cunning. You can position. You can observe. But when the games themselves are
not even fully defined, you cannot optimize. What you can do is adapt. Adaptation,
in the pro-active sense, means watching for the next wave that is coming, figuring
out what shape it will take, and positioning the company to take advantage of it.4
The “next wave” for the Navy is NCO.
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 2 9
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NCO IS TOO BIG AND TOO COMPLEX
There are only two paths that lead to a network-centric navy: it can be engi-
neered, or it can evolve. The correct choice depends solely on whether the net-
work-centric Navy is a “complicated system” or a “complex adaptive system.”
Engineered systems are built, often to a complicated plan with detailed specifica-
tions that reduce a system to simple, manageable parts and subsystems. Com-
plex adaptive systems, in contrast, grow from simple specifications and
eventually achieve a highly complex form in response to positive and negative
feedback between the system’s components, and between the system and its en-
vironment. When the nature of complex adaptive systems is understood, it be-
comes clear that NCO is beyond the scope of the most sophisticated engineering
methods. While it is true that some components must be engineered and built,
the network-centric Navy must evolve and grow.
A complex adaptive system, like a beehive, is an emergent system, with its own
identity and with characteristics that result from the interactions of many
agents.5 There is no bee in charge, and no bee understands the nature of the hive.
The behavior of a hive, tornado, rain forest, or stock market cannot be predicted
by the complete scientific knowledge of a single agent. Similarly, the net-
work-centric Navy will have apparent behaviors, properties, and capabilities
that are very different from what might be predicted by a study of its small parts.
Until recently, human agents have been nearly as uninformed as bees in their
practical understanding of how survivable adaptive systems come into being.
Ingrained by several hundred years of successful linear, cause-and-effect experi-
ences, human agents are inclined to think they are capable of designing some-
thing as complex as a network-centric navy. This misunderstanding may result
in unnecessarily high risks and large penalties.
Engineering methods have led to very successful and complicated systems,
like the modern aircraft carrier and the submarine-based component of the U.S.
strategic nuclear deterrent force. Indeed, many components of NCO, particu-
larly sensors, communications links, and weapons, will be engineered systems.
It is important that the engineered portions of NCO be limited to enabling
functions, such as engineering protocols and standards that foster reliability,
security, compatibility, and adaptability. Finally, the engineered components
must be flexible and responsive to changing requirements as the larger NCO
system evolves.
Engineered systems are optimized systems. System optimization usually fo-
cuses on achieving desired qualities like low cost, high speed, or stealth, for ex-
ample. However, the problem is that the final optimized product is likely to be
short-lived in utility, or fail completely, if required to perform under conditions
for which it was not created. In nature, evolved complex systems tend to be
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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messy, with redundancies and extra structure that engineers would eliminate if
given the chance. The primary purpose of this apparent messiness is survivabil-
ity, which is achieved through a form of parallel processing that tries all possibil-
ities at the same time and keeps track of all the best results, rather than the few
for which human design might try to optimize.
A fitness landscape graphically depicts the many states available to a complex
system. On a three-dimensional plot, high-performance, advantageous solu-
tions are represented by local peaks on the landscape. There are many peaks,
some better than others, but it is often impossible to predict one’s relative fitness
with certainty. To further complicate matters, even if a choice could be made to
occupy one of the best peaks, the landscape of a complex system is constantly
changing. A peak can quickly erode to become a valley, as the environment (cul-
ture, adversaries, technology, etc.) continues to change, both independently of
and in response to the U.S. military posture. This is how the world works in truly
complex biological, business, and military systems.
“Finding a solution, or a peak, is not difficult. What evolution in nature, and evo-
lutionary programs in computers excel at, is hill climbing to global summits, or the
highest peaks around, when the terrain is rugged with many false summits.”6
Fitness landscapes are abstract, and their utility is at best difficult to establish.
It is quite possible to never know if the emerging network-centric Navy missed a
global peak. The best that can be done is to ensure that an unbiased, evolution-
ary path is followed as closely as possible, putting faith in the scientific integrity
of evolutionary processes. By choosing an evolutionary (vice engineering) ap-
proach, the probability is maximized that the “big bet” will be a winner.
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NCO WILL CHANGE OUR VIEW OF THINGS
The issue of NCO should be separated from the competitive struggle to define the
size, structure, and organization of the “Navy after Next.” As elements of NCO be-
come available and routine within U.S. forces, they will provide the context for
many important questions—profound questions that will require new thinking if
the Navy hopes to take full advantage of the next wave. Some examples are:7
• What will the impact be on fixed, heavily defended, or high-risk targets if
they are attacked with precision naval “fires” instead of by tactical aircraft?
What alternative missions will the aircraft execute, and how will that
change the pace of conflict?
• How will important targets be found, as they become increasingly mobile
or concealed? The enemy will not present itself in mass formations in front
of U.S. firepower. Affordable sensors are needed to perform the dangerous
work of discovery, and eventually they will do so with remarkable precision
and speed. If abundant, low-cost sensors are built and deployed to find
mobile targets, will there be enough sea-based launchers or tactical aircraft
to deliver timely fires? Will tactical forces be authorized to engage these
targets freely?
• What will be the impact of dispersed and unmanned airborne vehicle
(UAV) sensors on the capability, safety, or effectiveness of naval
expeditionary forces? How will NCO alter the political and military value
of ground forces? If a special-forces team or a company of Marines can
detect and monitor enemy movements and activities in its vicinity and then
depend on tactical air support at distances that exceed time-of-flight
requirements for sea-based fires, then surely the calculus of mission
accomplishment versus risk and casualty avoidance (including risk from
friendly fire) will be dramatically altered.
• Will smaller, faster, networked ground forces make it possible to better
accomplish missions that are currently attempted only with large, heavy
forces? To what extent is the current insistence on overwhelming numerical
superiority driven by the need for self-protection in the face of uncertainty?
• One physical characteristic of modern warfare is the high rate of fire. Will
high rates of fire still be required if precise and timely targeting
information is available to complement the smart weapons?
• Logistical estimation and planning seem bent on sustaining rates of fire
appropriate to attrition-based warfare. What are the logistics implications
of precision fires based on a robust sensor and targeting network? Will the
logistics burden shift from munitions to sensors?
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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• Will improved combat effectiveness make leaders more likely to use
military force in the belief that casualties and collateral damage are less
likely? Perhaps the deterrent effect of these increased capabilities will
reduce the need for actual armed conflict. What conditioning factors will
produce either outcome for U.S. military forces in the information age?
• It is expected that networked warfare will proceed with increased speed and
intensity, producing effects that extend across both operational and
strategic domains. What measures of effectiveness can be used to evaluate
U.S. capabilities against adversaries and guide commanders in their
assessments of a conflict in progress?
Because of NCO, questions like these will require new ways of thinking about
warfare at the operational and tactical levels. They illustrate some of the sweep-
ing changes that have already begun to alter the Navy’s fitness landscape. Since
many of the conclusions could portend changes that require long lead-times, the
Navy should expedite the implementation of NCO to ensure that long-lead is-
sues will be studied in the best possible context.
IMMEDIATE VALUE AND PAYBACKS
Military strategists are sometimes accused of planning and spending for the
worst-case and least likely scenarios. Given the difficulty of accurate forecasting
and the gravity of failure in war, however, it would be negligent to do otherwise.
It is usually assumed that military forces will be adaptable enough to handle any
lesser and included scenarios, down through operations other than war. The
programs, plans, and preparations are usually big, but most U.S. military activi-
ties are scaled down before action. Conditioned by this methodology, some mis-
takenly assume that NCO must start out as an all-encompassing system aimed at
the worst case, major theater war (MTW). A plan to build such a system capable
of fighting on an MTW scale would require a resource commitment that threat-
ens numerous military programs and organizations.
Network-centric operations, however, are different. Since NCO is about how
people organize and interact, it will be scaleable from the bottom up. Its highest
payback is likely to result from its leverage in smaller conflicts, where it is very
difficult to reconcile high operational risks and relatively low national security
interests. Finally, due to the current U.S. military preponderance, it would ap-
pear that the nation will have a decade or two of breathing space in which to nur-
ture and expand NCO capabilities before any MTW conflict is likely to erupt.
An additional incentive for the aggressive implementation of NCO is that it
will be an important force multiplier—even in the near term, as early elements
of NCO are introduced in the fleet. Some technical elements of the future NCO
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 3 3
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force, precision munitions and UAVs, have already seen combat. In Kosovo, im-
provised target localization by UAVs enabled high-altitude air attacks against
ground forces with minimal risk.8 In short, a new sensor input linked to the in-
formation grid enabled forces to address a tactical problem that was largely pre-
cluded by adverse environmental conditions and risk-avoidance policies. These
results should be further analyzed and projected to larger-scale operations.
SENSORS ARE THE BIGGEST OBSTACLES
While it continues to enjoy a substantial margin of conventional military supe-
riority, the United States should pound away at its current most glaring defi-
ciency—the inability to find and attack dispersed targets under such adverse
conditions as rain, harsh terrain, and enemy deception. Sensors, because they
are today’s greatest deficiency, and because of tomorrow’s absolute dependence
on them, are the common thread between the “Navy of Today” and the “Navy af-
ter Next.”
The obstacles to sensor solutions are immense because they are both pro-
grammatic and cultural. Sensors have long been integrated with platforms. In-
dependent sensor programs are perceived to be in competition with platforms
for funding and missions. Yet in the face of new and affordable technological
threats to platforms, U.S. forces must not continue to pretend they will be al-
lowed to sail or fly sensors on manned platforms to wherever they are needed in
a modern battlespace. Offboard sensors may have presented a threat to manned
platforms in the past, but in the future they will likely be the essential enabling
factor that saves them from obsolescence. Viewed in this way, there will still be
programmatic competition for funding, but progress should be possible when
sensor and platforms missions are brought into coalescence. Both are essential
elements of NCO.
EXPEDITIONARY SENSORS ARE DIFFERENT
Several general properties of effective sensors are critical to their successful em-
ployment: they must be affordable, available, and suitable for expeditionary op-
erations. The uniqueness of expeditionary warfare and its special demands on
the sensor system require further explanation.
“Expeditionary” is the defining quality of U.S. naval forces. Today, when an air
strike against a distant target may be launched from the continental United States,
it is important to understand that power projection by any single means does not
qualify as expeditionary. Instead, an expeditionary force provides a flexible comple-
ment of military tools that can be speedily applied to a wide spectrum of situations
and crises.
1 3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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The expeditionary tool-set includes air strikes, but other tasking as well, from
humanitarian assistance to air, ground, sea, or cyberspace forces in high-inten-
sity combat. Expeditionary operations are constrained both in geography (size
and location) and duration. Geographical size limitations are obvious;
theaterwide expeditionary warfare is rarely discussed. U.S. forces deploy
theaterwide in peacetime, however, because forward presence is the entry fee for
early and meaningful access to potential adversaries in the event of conflict. An
explanation of the limited duration quality of expeditionary warfare is that the
force must be capable of sustaining its operations either to deter conflict, fight to
victory on its own, or gain a military foothold and hold the line until less mobile,
heavy ground and air forces can be brought into position. Another time-related
point is that expeditionary forces are best used early in a crisis, when initial condi-
tions are often not fully understood
and the likelihood of surprising events
is high. They must be versatile and
adaptable to limit the adverse effects
of being surprised.
Despite the constraints of geogra-
phy and duration, there are few re-
strictions on the intensity of expeditionary warfare, except those that could be
imposed by default if the United States failed to organize, train, and equip its
forces adequately. Such a failure could render U.S. forces unusable if the adver-
sary is willing to risk high levels of violence.
The expeditionary sensor capabilities necessary to support such a range of ac-
tivities are substantial. The United States is averse to prolonged attrition warfare
and avoidable collateral damage, and expectations in those respects have been
raised for future conflicts. The practical utility of expeditionary forces increas-
ingly depends on precision munitions. Better sensors are urgently needed so
that aim points for these munitions can be generated for both fixed and mobile
targets throughout the battlespace. Specifically:
• National sensor systems optimized for wide-area cueing will not do.
Systems that depend on remote-site interpretation or analysis will not
succeed if analysts cannot relate the data to the highly fluid context of
expeditionary operations. The expeditionary commander and his
subordinate forces must be able to adjust the focus, or granularity, of their
expeditionary sensors to achieve sufficient situational awareness at all
levels.
• To be affordable, reconnaissance and surveillance cannot be limited to a
few expensive systems, such as space-based sensors. Existing
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 3 5
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microtechnologies should point the way for production of abundant, even
disposable, sensors.
• A premise of forward presence is that access to a potential battlespace is
developed and refined through peacetime operations, constituting an
essential precondition for rapid attainment of operational superiority in
conflict. Therefore, expeditionary sensors should be continually in service
with all deployed forces, so that the transition to warfare is nearly
transparent to the operators. Ideally, in war, the only additional step might
be to press a “launch” button. If the naval commander’s sensor
requirements are to be met, that commander must control them,
regardless of which military branch builds or operates the hardware. Even
with the best of intentions, beware the difficulties if the supporting
organization does not understand the requirement for twenty-four-
hours-per-day, 365 days-per-year support to forward-deployed forces.
• A naval expeditionary force requires a flexible system that can change
rapidly from routine peacetime operations to open conflict. During
peacetime, the sensors must function within the constraints of territorial
airspace and sea limitations. In war, the sensor system should smoothly
expand to include more intrusive sensors as necessary, to give the
commander’s networked forces sufficient situational awareness to rule the
battlespace.
As effective sensors are introduced, tactical forces will adapt and innovate to
use them in ways that enlightened planners could have never prescribed. The
creativity of personnel at the operational level should never be underestimated.
It would be wise to put robust sensor-to-shooter tools in their hands and then
take good notes while they develop and explore the possibilities.
This is not to trivialize the significant work to be done by cross-disciplinary
studies based on exciting new efforts in the fields of complexity, chaos, and
self-organization. The new sciences will enable significant results on several lev-
els. First, they will assist in the design of system interfaces to present timely and
useable information without overwhelming the operators. They will help deter-
mine where best to locate the complexity and decision-making elements in na-
val systems. The theoretical rigor to be gained from these efforts will be as
important to warfare in the information age as the study of thermodynamics
was to the development of new, efficient engines in the Industrial Age. At a
higher level, the new sciences promise broad understandings of warfare. The ca-
pability of U.S. forces will be greatly amplified when they are networked, but the
most dramatic increases in combat power will come from new ways of thinking
about warfare. Since warfare is a complex, adaptive system, clarification and
1 3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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control of the very forces that determine its outcome will produce high payoffs.
In short, the goal is to focus on the adversary’s high-leverage points with unprec-
edented pace and intensity, to produce effects that directly impact the adver-
sary’s will to fight.
EXPEDITIONARY SENSORS SHOULD BE FUNDED
The national defense system is conservative and risk averse. It is not likely that
such a system will easily permit a radical departure from the past, especially for a
concept, since, by definition, concepts are incomplete and lack formal proof.
The defense system is responsive to competition, however, in that it will gener-
ally recognize threats to its relevance, and it permits incremental commitments
to concepts or systems that preserve or restore that relevance.
The 1999 operations in Kosovo, for instance, presented a serious challenge to
the military’s relevance. Regardless of how one interprets that “victory,” there
was still an undeniable sense of helplessness over the difficulty of dealing with
dispersed forces on the ground. It would be unconscionable to ignore this
wake-up call, possibly to find U.S. forces in a future conflict with higher national
security interests at stake but the sensor gaps unchanged. This is a compelling
reason why new sensors should be funded and aggressively developed.
NCO WILL TAKE CARE OF ITSELF
NCO will not be substantially funded, at least in the near term, because as a con-
cept it is too vague, and as a large-scale system it is probably unaffordable. Yet
even if cost were no object, it would be a major mistake to view NCO as a com-
pleted thought, or as a well-defined program ready to fund, construct, and con-
trol. The Navy should accept this and, without breaking stride, grow (vice build)
a network-centric force. One appealing aspect of NCO is that tremendous com-
bat advantages could accrue from the synergy of self-organization. If this is true
for networked warfare, it should also be credible for the Navy’s transition to net-
work-centric warfare. NCO will take care of itself, if it is allowed to evolve
through a self-organizing process.
Recall from the fitness landscape metaphor that the ultimate aim is to find a
global peak, where fitness, adaptability, and survivability are maximized. In na-
ture, and in computerized artificial-intelligence simulations, the proven
strength of the evolutionary process lies in its ability to test and compare all pos-
sible solutions in parallel and provide feedback of these results to the system.
There will always be irreducible uncertainty about the outcomes of complex
processes, but evidence everywhere corroborates the fact that evolutionary
paths produce the best complex systems. The key to a successful transition to the
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 3 7
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network-centric Navy lies not in a clear vision of the future but in the Navy’s
ability to identify and follow an unbiased, evolutionary path.
A coherent strategy is required in order to set the evolutionary process in mo-
tion. Some suggestions:
• There is an important role for naval leadership. In biological evolution,
genetic information “constrains the self-organizing process to those
options which have a high probability of success.”9 Naval leadership must
perform a similar function, keeping the learning process alive and the
Navy’s evolution on a path toward continuous, unbiased creativity.
• To unleash the transition process, start by fixing the sensors. The
expeditionary qualities of sensors must be further refined and articulated.
Currently available technologies must be leveraged to expedite sensor
solutions.
• Continue current efforts to ensure that communications are sufficient,
secure, and widely compatible.
• Let the fleet’s incremental implementation of sensor and network
technologies become an expeditionary-warfare laboratory. Over time, fleet
participation will allow many possible solutions to be tested and compared.
Encourage, reward, and document fleet experimentation.
• Assess fleet experiments through the lens of new, developing
systems-analysis tools and feed the results back into the process. Make the
best results prominent (publish them as doctrine and tactics) and allow less
useful practices to become extinct.
From complexity theory, it is clear that long-term predictability is an impos-
sible illusion. There is no clear relationship between cause and effect, except over
the short term.
Ralph Stacey states that “members of an organization, no matter how intelli-
gent and powerful, will be unable to predict the specific long-term outcomes of
their actions. They may specify any specific long-term state they wish to or have
any dream, fantasy, or vision they like, but they will never be able to determine
the sequence of actions required to actualize them. They may have whatever in-
tention they like, but they will never be able to realize it.”10
If this is true, what then is the role of leadership in a complex organization?
Stacey argues that instead of hopelessly striving for a specific long-term out-
come, managers should use their leadership style and power to influence a set of
“control parameters” that determine whether their organization will be creative
and innovative. “We can identify causal links between control parameters and
organizational dynamics. In principle, we can design creative organizations and
1 3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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then rely on them to produce emergent futures.”11 The control parameters that
management can influence include: (1) the degree of diversity that is toler-
ated, (2) the levels of anxiety contained in the organization (in response to
internally and externally generated tensions), (3) the number of feedback
paths that drive the rate of information flow, and (4) the degree of power
difference in the organization and how that power is used.
One of the most difficult things about this whole business is the illusion of
control, and how important it is to most people that it be preserved. Yet many
successful commanding officers will be quick to acknowledge that they have im-
proved their commands’ ability to function by giving up some of that control,
often by empowering their subordinates. The effects of many leadership tech-
niques will be better understood if they are interpreted as adjustments of
Stacey’s control parameters. In gen-
eral, it does not appear that com-
plexity theory will ever lead to new
formulae for leaders. Instead, it of-
fers a new way of looking at how
complex organizations really func-
tion, and a more coherent way of interpreting what successful leaders already do.
These are exciting times. Every sailor and Marine has an opportunity to be
part of something significant, since transformations of this magnitude—from
an industrial-age navy to an information-age navy—rarely occur. This particu-
lar transition will happen only once. It is still early enough in the process for a
thoughtful strategy that promotes an evolutionary and creative approach to
NCO to improve substantially the probability of success in this “big bet.”
During the evolutionary shift to a network-centric force, the Navy will ac-
quire valuable tools to deal with the disproportionate risks of today’s smaller
conflicts. It will also learn how to scale its new skills to encompass a large, com-
plex operational battlespace. In the end, we will have built a beehive.
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